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Examining the International Judicial
Function: International Courts as Dispute
Resolvers
ANNA SPAIN*
INTRODUCTION
International courts are a fundamental component of the
international legal system.1 They exist to provide an impartial forum
capable of settling disputes between nations by administering binding
decisions based on international law. But when should international
courts aim to serve a different goal? How might their international
judicial function bring about an end to a legal dispute in order to further
aims of critical importance to the international community as a whole?
Are international courts responsible for promoting global peace and
security and is it ever appropriate for courts and judges to engage in
judicial peacemaking?
Questioning the function of international courts, and the judges
they engage, is an intrepid task, in part, because of certain assumptions
about what dispute settlement is and what it is not. Asking courts to
engage in activities that extend beyond adjudication seems contrary to
the authority vested in them by the international community of States
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. This article was originally
presented at the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) symposium on The
International Judicial Function at the University of Amsterdam in March 2011. I am grateful to
Jean d’Aspremont, David Caron, Cesare Romano, Yuval Shany, Phillipe Sands, Judge Tullio
Treves of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the participants of the PICT
symposium, and the participants of the University of Colorado Law School workshop for their
helpful comments. I also wish to give special thanks to Professor Samantha Besson for her
detailed written response to an earlier draft, which has provided insights I have incorporated here.
1. This article uses the term “international courts” to describe judicial and arbitral
institutions that engage in international adjudication. See Philippe Sands, Introduction to RUTH
MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS ix–xvi (2d ed.
2010) (defining international courts and tribunals and describing the array of institutions that
comprise the international judicial system).
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and may threaten their legitimacy.2 However, the very historical
formation of many judicial institutions provides an alternative narrative.
That narrative imagines that courts are institutions that have been
created after times of international conflict in order to address the
causes that led to war and to prevent States from resorting to the use of
force as a means for resolving their differences.3 This history calls into
question whether international courts should concern themselves with
the promotion of global peace and security.
Within this context, this article undertakes an examination of the
international judicial function of international courts, exploring both
what it is and what it ought to be. There are two commonly held ways
of understanding the purpose of the international judicial function in
this context. A conservative view understands the judicial function of
international courts as one of dispute settlement. As institutions formed
by international agreement to provide adjudication through judicial
settlement or arbitration, international courts have the authority and the
capacity to produce binding judgments that settle disputes.4 Under this
perspective, dispute settlement is a functional, pragmatic activity.
Courts perform their duties without exceeding their judicial authority
with the aim of serving their State clients. This function is valuable and
necessary and has grown in recent decades with the establishment of
new judicial forums.5
2. See, e.g., R.P. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 183–90 (1969)
(discussing the challenges and limitations of the judicial process and the ICJ). Anand also notes
that
if the judges are asked to solve questions for which accepted judicial techniques afford
no satisfactory answer, the matter indeed becomes difficult and disturbing . . . . In a
rapidly changing and varied world . . . in order that international law may be adapted to
changing conditions, alongside the judicial bodies, it is essential to develop other
procedures of adjustment.
Id. at 186.
3. See, e.g., Nancy Amoury Combs, Diplomatic Adjudication, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 267, 273
(2001) (describing the function of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as serving both a functional
purpose of effectively managing the adjudication of claims and a diplomatic aim of managing the
relationship between the United States and Iran).
4. Joseph Sinde Warioba, Monitoring Compliance with and Enforcement of Binding
Decisions of International Courts, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 41 (2001).
5. See Sands, supra note 1, ix–xvi (describing the trend towards compulsory jurisdiction);
Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791,
792–95 (2007) (discussing the shift toward compelling disputants to consent to the jurisdiction of
an international adjudicative body); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Not Quite a World Without Trials:
Why International Dispute Resolution Is Increasingly Judicialized, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 119
(2006) (discussing the increase in the use of trials to resolve international legal disputes); and see
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A more audacious and normative understanding of the
international judicial function holds that international courts are
peacemakers. That is, their institutional function is to provide dispute
settlement in a manner that promotes global peace and security.6 This
view finds support in the historical development of the international
judicial system. Many of the judicial institutions and practices of today
were born in the aftermath of armed conflicts as States sought ways to
prevent future wars. The creation of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) after World War II under the UN Charter offers an archetype.7
Even absent a clear and authoritative mandate, other courts have been
known to engage in dispute resolution for peacemaking purposes. The
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), for example, has recognized its
part in providing a peacemaking function when adjudicating disputes
that are a part of ongoing armed conflicts.8 However, there are
challenges to this function and this article examines two: the doctrine
of justiciability, which seeks to limit the expansion of judicial powers
by restricting the type of disputes international courts may address;9 and
the doctrine of litispendence, which seeks to define how international
courts should coordinate with other institutions engaged in
peacemaking.10
These two perspectives of the judicial function of international
courts—as dispute settlers or as peacemakers—are at times in tension
with one another. Though all courts aim to settle disputes, not all courts

generally Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good
or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 267 (2001); Stephen Schwebel, The Proliferation of International
Tribunals: Threat or Promise, in JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW—FURTHER SELECTED
WRITINGS OF STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL 101, 107 (2011) (describing the proliferation of judicial
opinions and proposing that “[a] possible if limited approach might be to extend the Court’s
advisory jurisdiction” to avoid conflicting interpretations of international law).
6. See HANS KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW, 13–14 (2000) (“As long as it is not possible
to remove from the interested States the prerogative to answer the question of law and transfer it
once and for all to an impartial authority, namely, an international court, any further progress on
the way to the pacification of the world is absolutely excluded.”).
7. See U.N. Charter Ch. VI, art. 36.3 (“[L]egal disputes should as a general rule be referred
by the parties to the International Court of Justice.”).
8. See generally, e.g., Delimiting Abyei Area (Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army), Final Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009), www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=
1240 [hereinafter Delimiting Abyei Area, Final Award] (providing terms for a delimitation of the
Abyei area).
9. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Doctrine of Non-Justiciable Disputes in International Law, 24
ECONOMICA 277, 277 (1928).
10. THEODOOR J.H. ELSEN, LITISPENDENCE BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 1 (1986).
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aim to be peacemakers. The first view of their function is concerned
with a court’s effectiveness while the latter is concerned with its
normative practice. Courts are bound to stay within their authority when
engaging in judicial settlement, yet resolving disputes may require
exercising extrajudicial powers to engage non-State stakeholders and
extralegal issues in the dispute resolution process. Furthermore, judicial
settlement is not designed to reconcile the relationship between the
parties or prevent recurrence of the dispute.11 When tensions escalate, it
is not clear that dispute settlement is an effective deterrent to war.
Yet, such challenges do not absolve international courts from their
responsibility to contribute to promoting global peace and security. As a
central part of the international legal machinery, courts have a role that
is not simply functional but is also normative. Judges and judicial
institutions do not exist in a sphere that can or should be isolated from
geopolitics and issues of concern to the international community.
International courts need to consider how they can better contribute to
an international legal system that can ensure the successful resolution of
disputes.
This article argues that what is needed is a third way of
understanding the international judicial function, one that respects
international courts’ traditional role as dispute settlers while allowing
for their more engaged and proactive function as peacemakers. This
requires adopting a new perspective, which abandons a dichotomous
view of the international judicial function. Under this new perspective,
international courts exist within the system of international dispute
resolution (IDR) containing a myriad of institutions and methods that
collectively aim to promote global peace and security.12 Furthermore,
the resolution of international disputes may require integrated IDR
approaches, such as combining judicial settlement with negotiation.13
11. See Richard B. Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as an International Dispute
Settlement Technique, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1982) (explaining the potential inability of a legal
judgment to address the underlying issues which prompted the legal dispute).
12. For purposes of this article, the IDR system includes institutions and other providers of
methods used to prevent, manage, and resolve international disputes by means of negotiation as
well as third-party methods, which include adjudication (judicial settlement and arbitration) and
other methods (conciliation, facilitation, and mediation). See Anna Spain, Integration Matters:
Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 8–9
(2010) (defining the architecture of the IDR system).
13. See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malay./Sing.), Judgment, 2008 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 102 (May 23) (where the disputant States
engaged in negotiations prior to referring the case to the ICJ). See generally Spain, supra note 12
(introducing the concept of integrated IDR through “multiple” and “mixed” IDR methods).
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Integration can occur sequentially through the use of multiple methods
(for example, negotiations may precede adjudication or mediation may
follow) or in a mixed-manner that allows different aspects of IDR
methods to be combined into one cohesive process.14
Understanding IDR as a system of methods that can be integrated
in their use creates new opportunities for international courts in their
role as dispute resolvers. At a minimum, international courts can
enhance international dispute resolution capacity by recognizing the
benefits of non-judicial methods.15 Recognition is becoming more
necessary as these methods proliferate in use and form.16 It will allow
international courts to be more responsive in recognizing their role in
relation to other actors in the IDR system.17 Second, some courts can
appropriately play a more active role by referring the parties to other
forms of IDR before or after a court undertakes judicial settlement.
Third, there is an institutional void that certain international judicial
bodies might fill. International courts might serve as institutional
coordinators, much like the “Multi-Door Courthouse” concept
pioneered by Frank Sander in 1979 that has become commonplace in
the United States.18 Though this model is not an exact fit because
international courts face challenges that domestic courts do not,19 it
does, nonetheless, embody the concept that courts can provide the
leadership necessary to coordinate the application of various IDR
methods in order to enhance the effectiveness of international dispute
resolution.
In summary, this article argues that in addition to engaging in
effective judicial discourse, issuing judgments, and providing judicial
settlement, international courts should exercise their influence in ways
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Spain, supra note 12, at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 45–46.
See generally Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler
eds., 1979) (Harvard Law Professor Frank Sander introduced the concept of the Multi-Door
Courthouse at the 1976 Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, also known as the “Pound Conference,” proposing that courts in the
U.S. should offer more than one “door” or method of dispute resolution. As a result, many courts
now refer disputing parties to mediation, facilitation, and other forms of nonjudicial dispute
resolution).
19. See generally Karin Oellers-Fraham, Multiplication of International Courts and
Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction—Problems and Possible Solutions, in MAX PLANCK Y.B.
UNITED NATIONS L. 67 (2001) (discussing the unique problems international courts face, which
are not associated with domestic courts).
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that enhance IDR.20 This is a normative claim that asserts that
international courts do have a responsibility to promote global peace
and security. To achieve this, international courts must understand their
role as adjudicators within the larger IDR system. There is not sufficient
space here to identify the actions that specific international courts might
take in this regard. This article does suggest, however, that courts
should recognize the value of other IDR methods and, when
appropriate, refer disputing parties to engage in them. International
courts should also determine how they might better coordinate with
other dispute resolution providers and how they might support methods,
such as mediation, that lack adequate institutional support at the
international level.21
Centered in this context, the following definitional understandings
apply. First, the term “international courts” refers to those institutions
created by international agreement for the purpose of adjudicating
disputes. These institutions include global courts (the ICJ, etc.),
arbitration institutions (the PCA, etc.), international criminal
adjudicative bodies (the International Criminal Court (ICC), etc.), and
human rights courts.22 Though each court operates within its own
mandate and authority, it does not operate in an isolated space. The
actions of one court can affect other courts and exert a sphere of
influence on the international judicial system as a whole. Each
institution is unique in its form and function, and this article does not
seek to evaluate them separately or in depth. Instead, this article
presumes that these institutions share the common goal of providing the
international judicial function through dispute settlement and in certain
instances, through peacemaking. Second, the terms “settlement,”
“peacemaking,” and “resolution” are used here to give a nuanced
understanding to the posited goal that each method seeks to achieve.
Resolution implies that the underlying circumstances giving rise to the
dispute have been satisfactorily addressed so that they no longer exist,
whereas settlement implies that the parties have reached a binding
agreement, whether or not underlying issues remain. In addition, an

20. See, e.g., HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALISATION (Sam Muller & Sidney Richards eds.,
2011) (for essays discussing transjudicial dialogue, judicial cooperation, legal unity, and other
theories of multiplicity in the international judicial system).
21. Spain, supra note 12, at 19. See also Anne Peters, International Dispute Settlement: A
Network of Cooperational Duties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 5, 9 (2003).
22. Sands, supra note 1, at v–vi (classifying international adjudicative bodies into these
categories).
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international court may use its adjudicative powers to provide a
peacemaking function to assist the parties in bringing about an end to
armed conflict. Third, international legal disputes often arise out of or
occur concurrently with international conflicts involving armed or
violent contact. This includes intrastate conflicts that, through spillover
effects or other circumstances, pose a threat to global peace and
security.23
This article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the dispute
settlement function of international courts. Part II examines
international courts as peacemakers and analyzes how the doctrines of
justiciability and litispendence influence this function. Part III
introduces a framework for understanding the judicial function of
international courts as one of dispute resolution. It argues that
international courts can enhance their judicial function by appreciating
how different IDR processes contribute to effective dispute resolution.
The article concludes by proposing how international courts might
contribute to international dispute resolution and promote peace and
security as a component of the broader IDR system.
I. COURTS AS DISPUTE SETTLERS
International courts settle disputes through judicial settlement or
arbitration.24 Adjudication by either method produces a binding decision
based on international law.25 The benefits of this process are many.
Above all, adjudication provides parties with a certainty of process and
an outcome that enjoys the authority and legitimacy of international
law.26
Although modern dispute settlement, which emerged in the late
19th century with the Alabama claims as the seminal case, was largely
ad hoc, today it enjoys a number of established forums.27 In addition to
23. See MEREDITH REID SARKEES & FRANK WHELON WAYMAN, RESORT TO WAR 1816–
2007, 46–60 (2010) (defining armed conflict by context including interstate, intrastate (civil and
internal), extrastate, and non-State. The international component of a given conflict has generally
been understood as occurring between States, but also applies to intrastate and non-State events
that present a threat to international peace and security due to spillover effects, the presence of
international crimes, and other factors.)
24. J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 91 (4th ed. 2005) (providing
definitions that distinguish one form from the other).
25. Id.
26. See Bilder, supra note 11, at 2–3.
27. 1 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 495 (John Basset Moore ed., 1898) (detailing the Alabama
claims); JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL
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the ICJ, parties may seek dispute settlement through the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or the Dispute Settlement
System of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and may seek
arbitration through the PCA or International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID).28 The ICC, ad hoc tribunals, and hybrid
tribunals are available for international criminal matters.29 There are
also courts that specialize in human rights, including the European
Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
and the African Commission on Human Rights. Together, these courts
and tribunals form the basis of the international judicial system.30
Given the diversity of judicial bodies, their differences, and
specializations, this article does not try to analyze the specific or unique
international judicial functions of each. The users of international
courts, the judges, and the courts themselves all hold perspectives about
what the judicial function is and should be. How a court performs its
functions necessarily depends on the context: the actors involved, the
type of case, the judicial institution as well as the external
circumstances surrounding the dispute.31 However, what is common
among international courts is that they are all judicial organs that
function according to the same parameters of the international legal
system.32 Given this, it is helpful to analyze the international judicial
function of dispute resolution from a contextual perspective, taking into
account historical influences as well as the environment in which courts
operate today.
The question this article considers is not whether the international
judicial function is one of dispute settlement—it is clear that it is—but
whether this is all the international judicial function should be. There
are several arguments in favor of limiting the international judicial

LAW 32–33 (1999) (describing the origins of modern arbitration dating back to the Treaty of
Amity, Commerce and Navigation (the “Jay Treaty”) and the transition from diplomacy to
decisions based on legal reasoning that occurred in the arbitration of the Alabama claims).
28. Sands, supra note 1, at ix–x (defining global courts as institutions that are potentially
available to all States and/or enjoy unlimited subject-matter jurisdiction).
29. Id. at v–vi, ix–xvii, 68.
30. See Sir Robert Y. Jennings, The Proliferation of Adjudicatory Bodies: Dangers and
Possible Answers, in 9 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BULLETIN 2, 3 (Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 1995). See also Sands, supra note 1 at xi.
31. Georges Abi-Saab, The Normalization of International Adjudication: Convergence and
Divergencies, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 9–10 (2010).
32. See id. (arguing that the concept of judicial function is not generic in nature but
influenced by particulars such as the structure of the international legal system).
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function to dispute settlement rather than the more expansive function
of peacekeeping.
First, the historical nexus between the evolution of courts and
international conflict does not automatically justify establishing
peacemaking as a function of international courts today. States’
motivations for pursuing adjudication should not be conflated with the
goal of pursuing peace.33
Second, judicial settlement is what courts are authorized to do.34
Most adjudicative institutions are formed by a mandate that authorizes
their role in pacific settlement of disputes and no more.35 Though some
institutions, such as the WTO, ITLOS, and ICSID, offer conciliation
and other methods in addition to judicial settlement, they are clear that
their role is an apolitical and functional one, not a mandate to intervene
in matters of peace and security.36 The view is that their role is to
provide the requisite legal and technical expertise needed to perform the
function of dispute settlement.37 By maintaining a narrow and
specialized focus, international courts, such as the ICSID and the WTO,
for example, enhance their expertise in a particular subject matter.38
Furthermore, some courts lack the capacity to do more.39 While the
ICJ is a court of general jurisdiction over all UN member States, other
courts have more limited jurisdiction.40 In addition, all courts are limited
33. See Jennings, supra note 30, at 7 (criticizing the “pacific” title in the Hague Convention
and arguing that the act of States resorting to adjudication as opposed to war is not to be conflated
with the distinction between pacific and non-pacific); David D. Caron, War and International
Adjudication: Reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 4, 17 (2000) (noting
that the founders of the Permanent Court of International Justice argued that judges should not
serve a diplomatic function).
34. Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 2.
35. See id. at 10.
36. Id. at 2; Jennings, supra note 30, at 7.
37. See Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 14.
38. Jennings, supra note 30, at 3–4.
39. J.G. Merrills, The Role and Limits of International Adjudication, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 169, 169–81 (W. E. Butler ed., 1987) (exploring “why
adjudication as a process is capable of dealing with some disputes and not with others”); G.
Shinkaretskaya, The Present and Future Role of International Adjudication as a Means for
Peacefully Settling Disputes, 29 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 87, 88–90 (1989) (suggesting that an
international court cannot play a role in avoiding armed conflict because the court has “no powers
to act independently and possess[es] very limited opportunities for influencing the political
conduct of State Parties to a dispute”); Rosalyn Higgins, Remedies and the International Court of
Justice: An Introduction, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA,
1, 2–5 (Malcolm D. Evans ed. 1998) (describing how the ICJ lacks the capacity to hear all of the
cases submitted to it in a timely manner).
40. Shinkaretskaya, supra note 39, at 88–90.
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in their ability to involve non-State stakeholders in the judicial
process.41 Courts are not designed to adjudicate extra-legal issues and,
therefore, are at a disadvantage when treating political, economic,
social, and cultural issues that arise in international disputes.42
Third, extending the international judicial function beyond judicial
settlement poses certain risks. It could compromise the legitimacy of a
court or of the judges themselves.43 If judges consider post hoc effects
of their judgment, they may be unduly influenced to decide the matter
differently. Furthermore, allowing international courts to decide matters
of vital State interest takes away a State’s role as the “ultimate judge of
disputed legal rights in its controversies with other States.”44
Though all of these reasons are worthy arguments in favor of
restricting the international judicial function to dispute settlement, they
fail to overcome a fundamental need to have international institutions,
including courts, help humanity pursue the goal, however aspirational,
of global peace.45 In reality many international legal disputes,
particularly those that arise in the context of an armed conflict, are also
political. It is true that judges should not be unduly influenced by
politics, but it would be unreasonable and impractical to ask them to
remain insulated from global affairs. If a judge knows that the outcome
of a case will influence whether or not violence continues, should that
not be a factor worthy of consideration? As Judge Corstends, President
of the Dutch Supreme Court, recommends “[p]erhaps one of the most
important lessons to learn for today’s highest courts is that they are not
isolated, that their problems are unlikely to be peculiar to their own
jurisdictions[.]”46 The answer is not to turn a blind eye to these
influences but to determine how they might enhance, not impede, the
international judicial function of dispute resolution.

41. See Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law, 52 INT’L
& COMP. L.Q. 1, 12 (2003) (describing both the increasing importance of non-State entities in
today’s global arena and the lack of legal jurisdiction over these entities).
42. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
4, 6–7 (1933).
43. Abi-Saab, supra note 31, at 10.
44. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 6–7.
45. Merrills, supra note 39, at 175.
46. Judge Geert Corstens, Foreward to HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALISATION, supra note
20, at vi.
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II. COURTS AS PEACEMAKERS
An alternative way of understanding the international judicial
function is to conceptualize international courts as peacemakers. There
is a historical nexus between the development of the international
judicial function of dispute resolution and the international
community’s efforts to ensure peace. Early forms of arbitration used a
third State to broker peace between two disputing States through ad hoc
processes that much resemble the forms we refer to today as good
offices and facilitation.47 Later attempts to formalize dispute resolution,
such as the creation of the PCA, coincided with a burgeoning peace
movement and contributed to the institutional development of courts as
peacemakers.48 The First Hague Peace Conference of 1899 was
convened by Czar Nicholas II of Russia “with the object of seeking the
most effective means of ensuring all peoples the benefits of a real and
lasting peace and, above all, of limiting the progressive development of
existing armaments.”49
After World War II, the international community considered the
question of responsibility for world peace and set up a framework for
preserving peace through the UN Charter.50 Article 92 established the
ICJ as “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations”51 responsible
for deciding legal disputes of an international nature.52 The Charter also
put additional IDR machinery into place with Article 2 calling upon all
nations to refrain from the threat or use of force.53 Article 33 requires
that “[t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first
of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or

47. Caron, supra note 33, at 4. See generally Abi-Saab, supra note 31 (discussing ad hoc
processes).
48. Caron, supra note 33, at 4.
49. Russian Circular Note Proposing the Program of the First Conference, THE HAGUE
CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 xvi (James Brown Scott ed., 1915).
50. U.N. Charter, supra note 7, pmbl. (“We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind . . .”).
51. Id. art. 92.
52. ICJ STATUTE arts. 2 and 36, respectively; Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59
Stat. 1031 (1945).
53. See U.N. Charter, supra note 7, art. 2 ¶ 4 (calling for nations to refrain from the threat or
use of force).
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arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”54 Article 24
establishes the mandate for the UN Security Council (UNSC) as bearing
the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security” and the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA) role,
respectively.55
The seminal example of an international court as peacemaker is the
ICJ. The ICJ Statute sets up the Court as the “principal judicial organ of
the United Nations”56 to serve as the primary court of general
jurisdiction for adjudicating disputes arising under international law.57
As an organ of the UN, the purpose of the ICJ is to assist in the
contribution of global peace and security by providing States with a
peaceful mechanism for resolving their differences. This historical
context establishes the international judicial function as a central
component of a system designed to ensure global peace.58 But providing
this role is not without its challenges. This article examines two:
justiciability and litispendence.
A. Justiciability
The question of justiciability presents a challenge for international
courts on several grounds. States have long sought clear criteria to
delineate the scope of judicial review for international courts.59 The
former U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, for example, criticized
the ICJ for its lack of clear criteria on the question of justiciability.60 He
argued that after the Cuban Missile Crisis there were certain political-

54. Id. art. 33, ¶ 1 (urging member nations to seek peaceful resolutions to international
disputes).
55. Id. arts. 10–22, 24.
56. ICJ STATUTE, art. 1. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 1, Oct. 24, 1945,
59 Stat. 1031.
57. See Christine Chinkin, Increasing the Use and Appeal of the Court, in INCREASING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ICJ/UNITAR COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT 56 (Connie
Peck & Roy S. Lee eds., 1997).
58. U.N. Charter pmbl.
59. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 238 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda) (discussing how the trauvaux
preparatoires of the ICJ Statute and applicable State practice suggest that, in accepting the ICJ
Statutes, States did not intend to submit themselves to judicial settlement over political disputes).
60. Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 13, 13–14 (1968).
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legal situations that were so central to a State’s vital interests that the
ICJ should not interfere.61
Indeed, States evaluate the competency of international courts in
part based on the court’s ability to clarify what kinds of disputes are
justiciable.62 The doctrine of justiciability that provides this clarification
has traditionally been determined by making the distinction between
disputes that are fundamentally legal in nature and those that are
political.63 Justiciability has been defined according to several criteria:
whether the judicial process can adequately address a dispute; whether
the dispute is sufficiently legal in nature; whether the dispute is over
rights or interests; and, whether, in deciding the dispute, a court would
have to interfere with a political act or question (e.g., regarding national
security, defense, foreign affairs, etc.).64
Lauterpacht, an early critic of using such dichotomies between
juridical and non-juridical issues as a basis for determining whether or
not a dispute is justiciable, suggests two important frames for examining
this problem.65 First, when States pursue judicial settlement through an
international court, the dispute is political. This is because all
international disputes are political if we define political as being of
importance to the State involved in the dispute.66 Beyond interstate
disputes, other kinds of international disputes may also be inherently
political if they implicate international interests, such as global peace
and security.67 Second, all international disputes may also be defined as
legal if we understand that to mean that the dispute can be addressed
through the application of international law.68 Furthermore, Lauterpacht
questions States’ assertion of nonjusticiability and believes that such
actions result from States’ preference to resolve matters through other
means.69 And indeed, States prefer mediation and other forms of non-

61. Id. See also EUGENE ROSTOW, Dispute Involving the Inherent Right of Self-Defense, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS 264, 264 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed.,
1987).
62. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 4, 6–7, 21, 42–45, 153–54, 158, 163–65.
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 4, 19.
65. Id. at 158.
66. Id. at vii, 153 (understanding international disputes, at that time, as interstate disputes).
67. See id. at 11.
68. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 158.
69. Id. at 163–65.
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judicial IDR to adjudication to resolve international disputes that arise
from armed conflict.70
Higgins proposes an alternative approach to analyzing justiciability
based on two dominant and opposing frameworks. The British approach
adopts a formalistic view that international courts are prohibited from
addressing political disputes.71 The American approach adopts a view
that judicial decision making necessarily involves making political and
social judgments; the two cannot be separated.72 Higgins argues that the
distinction provided by the terms “political dispute” and “legal dispute”
is valuable not because it describes the nature of the dispute but because
it describes the nature of the process by which the dispute is to be
resolved.73
A third approach to determine the justiciability of disputes is to
clarify whether they are over rights or interests. Understood as the
doctrine of ‘inherent limitations’ of the judicial function in international
law, conflicts of rights are justiciable, whereas conflicts of interests are
not.74 The ICJ Statute merely requires that disputes include “any
question of international law” and thus, does not speak to the
rights/interests distinction.75 In practice, the ICJ has decided many cases
involving political interests including Nicaragua,76 Certain Expenses,77
70. See JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM 1945 TO 2003, 29 (2004) (illustrating that in a study of 343
international conflicts, 59.3% used mediation, 32.2% used negotiation, 3.6% were referred to
international organizations, 3% used multilateral conferences, 1.3% had no management, and
only 0.6% resorted to arbitration); Derrick V. Frazier & William J. Dixon, Third-Party
Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946-2000, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 395 (2006)
(using a dataset documenting conflict management of militarized interstate disputes occurring
from 1946 to 2000 and finding that mediation was the most preferred IDR method, and
adjudication was among the least preferred).
71. Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and the International Judicial Process, in
THEMES AND THEORIES 21–23, 34 (2009).
72. Id. at 22–23. See also R. P. Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States Toward Certain
Problems of International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55, 56, 66, 73 (1966) (arguing that third
world States may generally subscribe to a view of international law located somewhere between
the British and American views and newly independent States are reluctant to accept ICJ
jurisdiction in disputes with former colonial powers, fearing that the ICJ will enforce the
“established legal rights” of former colonizers. These States are otherwise accepting of the
international legal system, viewing it as sufficiently objective to protect them from more powerful
States).
73. Higgins, supra note 71, at 34.
74. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 42–45.
75. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
76. See generally Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (sustaining Nicaragua’s claims that U.S.
support of insurrectionary forces in Nicaragua was an unlawful use of armed force and an
impermissible intervention in Nicaragua’s internal affairs).
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and Nuclear Weapons.78 There are also cases, such as Anglo Iranian Oil
Co., where the parties involved were reluctant to pursue judicial
settlement because conflicts over interests were at issue and they
believed that the ICJ’s judicial function should be to enforce existing
legal rights.79
As a practical matter, it is difficult to establish clear criteria by
which to distinguish what is legal from what is political. In part, this is
because the legal and political natures of a dispute are vitally
interconnected. Though certain issues are political questions, which are
not justiciable (e.g., intra-governmental conflicts, claims attacking the
legitimacy of a State’s political authority, questions concerning the
source of legal power),80 the political angles that arise in the context of
international disputes are not so clearly defined. Many international
disputes are multifaceted and naturally involve both legal and extralegal issues.81 Moreover, legal issues are difficult to identify and treat
independently of the larger context of the conflict in which they might
occur.
The Nicaragua case illustrates several difficulties that have arisen
around these questions. Nicaragua was the first case in which the ICJ
was called upon to adjudicate the legality of a State’s use of force
during an ongoing conflict. Nicaragua claimed that U.S. support of the
Contras amounted to illegal intervention into its internal affairs, a
breach of international law involving both a clear legal dispute as well
as a political one.82 The United States argued that because the issues
before the Court were part of an ongoing, armed conflict they were
inherently political in nature and were therefore nonjusticiable.83 The
77. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, at 8 (July
20).
78. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Order,
1995 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 1).
79. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, 1952 I.C.J. 5, at 8–10
(July 22) (outlining Iran’s arguments for why the ICJ lacked jurisdiction).
80. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 40
(1991) (describing the legal category of “political questions” as a tool of judicial self-restraint and
deference to executive or legislative power).
81. See Hermann Mosler, Problems and Tasks of International Judicial and Arbitral
Settlement, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (Mosler and Bernhardt, eds.,
1974) at 10 (arguing that defining the legal nature of a dispute by linking it to an underlying right
as established by international law is an unhelpful distinction).
82. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J at 27, 37.
83. For further explanation of the U.S. position, see an article by then Deputy Agent for the
United States in the Nicaragua proceedings Patrick M. Norton, The Nicaragua Case: Political
Questions Before the International Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 459 (1987).

20

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:5

United States stated its view that the ICJ “was never intended to resolve
issues of collective security and self-defense and is patently unsuited for
such a role.”84
This reasoning is not new. States object to judicial interference in
political matters on the grounds that it interferes with their sovereign
rights, that the issues are too complex for the Court to address, that the
decision implicates broader public interests outside the purview of the
Court, and that the Court ought to restrain its activities in accordance
with the roles of other institutions such as the UNGA and the UNSC.85
Ultimately, the ICJ found that it had jurisdiction to consider Nicaragua’s
claims against the U.S. on the merits and decided in favor of
Nicaragua.86
As Nicaragua suggests, the doctrine of justiciability is not a strong
limitation on the exercise of international judicial power.87 Absent
objective criteria, distinguishing political from legal becomes a matter
of preference and philosophy.88 Furthermore, international courts today
recognize that international disputes are often a mix of political and
legal dimensions.89 Thus, it is helpful to understand justiciable disputes
as those that the judicial process is best designed to address. Identifying
when and why adjudication is the superior method for resolving a
dispute is pragmatic and emphasizes the need to base valuation of
adjudication on its effectiveness as a tool for dispute resolution.90
Nonetheless, the doctrine of justiciability remains relevant.91
Justiciability provides States with a means, however modest, by which

84. Statement of the Department of State on U.S. Withdrawal from Nicaragua Proceedings,
19 January 1985, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 438, 439 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Western Sahara, ICJ Reports 1975 ¶¶ 46–47 (where the ICJ was challenged by
the lack of factual sources and their competency to engage in problem solving in this context).
86. Norton, supra note 83, at 525; The ICJ found it had jurisdiction by 11-to-4 vote, per the
ICJ Statute, to hear the substantive issues of the case and decided in its June 1986; Judgment to
uphold the Nicaraguan claims against the United States. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 292; Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 36(2), (5), Oct. 24, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031.
87. Norton, supra note 83, at 525.
88. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 80, at 45 (describing the political dimension to defining
justiciability, specifically how the distinction between justiciable and nonjusticiable cases shifts
in relation to the ICJ’s efforts to cooperate with other institutions).
89. Norton, supra note 83, at 499.
90. For literature advocating this approach, see Rosalyn Higgins, Policy Considerations and
the International Judicial Process, 17 INT’L. & COMP. L. Q. 58, 74 (1968); MCWHINNEY, supra
note 80, at 44–45 (suggesting that this distinction is pragmatic in nature for determining when
judicial intervention would provide a benefit to an already political problem).
91. “It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be
compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any
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to limit the exercise of judicial power and control the nature and scope
of the international judicial function. Until the international community
grapples with States’ discomfort with judicial power, this doctrine will
continue to serve as a measure of when and in what capacity judicial
intervention is appropriate.
B. Litispendence
If international courts are to serve as peacemakers, what is their
appropriate role and how should they interact with other IDR
institutions? This question is one of coordination. The doctrine of
litispendence addresses this problem by articulating a standard that aims
to avoid conflicts over jurisdiction.92 The doctrine of litispendence is a
plea that can be raised when there is “(i) an identical matter, (ii) pending
between the same parties, (iii) before organs possessing similar
jurisdiction,” for the purpose of barring one institution from handling
the case.93
In the context of promoting peace in the face of armed conflict,
jurisdictional conflicts most commonly occur between the ICJ and the
UNSC.94 The UN Charter established both institutions in the pursuit of
global peace and security,95 but they have different emphases. The
UNSC is charged with the primary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security,96 while the ICJ is charged with settling
international legal disputes.97 The UNSC is a political body comprised
of States whereas the ICJ is a judicial body, which purports to be
independent from individual States and represents the interests of the
international community as a whole.98 So what is the appropriate action
when both institutions seek to address the same international dispute?
This question arose in the Lockerbie case where the ICJ had to
determine two legal disputes: whether Libya had an international
other kind of pacific settlement.” Eastern Carelia (Fin v. Russ.) 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 27
(July 23).
92. ELSEN, supra note 10, at 1.
93. DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER
VII OF THE UN CHARTER 217 (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 2001). See also ELSEN, supra note 10, at 1.
94. ELSEN, supra note 10, at 1.
95. U.N. Charter, supra note 7, art. 7.
96. Id. art. 24.
97. Id. art. 92 (“the ICJ shall be the principle judicial organ of the UN”). See also Statute of
the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945) (giving the ICJ the power to “settle all
legal disputes concerning a) the interpretation of a treaty and b) any question of international
law”).
98. U.N. Charter arts. 4, 92.
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obligation to extradite its nationals, and whether the United States and
the United Kingdom had a claim that Libya should be implicated in
terrorism.99 After the claims were filed, the UNSC called upon Libya in
Resolution 748 to extradite its nationals.100 Under Article 39 of the UN
Charter the UNSC has the authority to determine “the existence of any
threat to peace . . . and to maintain or restore international peace and
security.”101 While the ICJ recognized the UNSC’s preeminence, the
Court had to determine whether this frustrated its judicial function of
settling legal disputes.102 As stated by ICJ Judge Alejandro Alvarez in
his dissent, “If a case submitted to the Court should constitute a threat to
world peace, the Security Council may seise itself of the case and put an
end to the Court’s jurisdiction.”103 In Lockerbie, the ICJ initially
deferred to the UNSC’s resolution when considering interim measures
regarding protection.104 But later, during the merits phase, the ICJ
determined it possessed the authority and jurisdiction to decide the
matters before it.105
Lockerbie may suggest that although the ICJ respects the role of
the UNSC, it does not find itself restricted by UNSC resolutions on the
basis of the political doctrine question.106 Similarly, in Kanyabashi, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that the political

99. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures,
1992 I.C.J. 132, 132–34 (Apr. 14) (declaration of Judge Ni).
100. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures,
1992 I.C.J. 129, 129 (Apr. 14) (declaration of Acting President Oda) [hereinafter Declaration of
Acting President Oda].
101. U.N. Charter art. 39.
102. Declaration of Acting President Oda, supra note 100, at 129 (“Whatever might have
been the previous position, resolution 748 (1992) or the Security Council leaves the Court with no
conclusion other than that to which it has come.”). Questions of Interpretation and Application of
the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1992 I.C.J. 199, 207 (Apr. 14) (dissenting opinion of
Judge El-Kosheri) (opining that UNSC Resolution 748 should not interfere with the pending
proceedings before the ICJ).
103. Anglo-Iranian Oil Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 45 (July 22) (dissenting opinion of
Judge Alejandro Alvarez).
104. SCHWEIGMAN, supra note 93, at 256–58.
105. Id. at 258–60 (there have been three cases where the ICJ deferred to the UNSC). See
also Mark Weller, The Lockerbie Case: A Premature End to the ‘New World Order’?, 4 AFR. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 303, 324 (1992) (arguing that UNSC decisions carry a presumption of
lawfulness that enhances States obligations to comply with the ICJ’s decision, even if the State
considers that decision to be ultra vires).
106. Weller, supra note 105, at 324.
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question doctrine did not bar their jurisdiction for judicial review.107 In
Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Trial Chamber applied the political question doctrine in determining
that it could not review UNSC’s decision justifying the creation of the
Tribunal.108 However, the Appeals Chamber reversed, finding that the
political question doctrine was antiquated and that the Court had a duty
to take jurisdiction over cases that turn on a legal question capable of a
legal answer, regardless of the political context.109
III. COURTS AS DISPUTE RESOLVERS
This section introduces a third way to understand the international
judicial function of international courts that appreciates the functional
purpose of dispute settlement alongside the normative purpose of
peacemaking. As dispute resolvers, international courts can serve both
aims. Adopting this perspective of the international judicial function of
international courts enhances understanding about their multiplicity,
complexity, and value in today’s world.
A. The Changing Nature of International Disputes
After the Peace of Westphalia, States created an international order
in which they were the dominant actors.110 The doctrine of sovereignty
afforded each nation the right to rule its territory and its subjects
without external interference.111 These foundations influenced States as
they developed interstate arbitration forums and, later, courts.112 In
addition, since most wars at that time were interstate, there was little
incentive to develop international judicial institutions that involved non107. See Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction, ¶ 22 (June 18, 1997), http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/Case/English/
Kanyabashi/decisions/180697.pdf.
108. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995).
109. Id.
110. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS VOL. II 33–50 (1925) (trans. Francis W.
Kelsey) and Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L. L. 1, 1–54 (1946) (both discussing the Peace of Westphalia and its influence on the
international legal order).
111. STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20–25 (1999) (defining
Westphalian sovereignty as the legal and political authority a State has to rule based on the
principles of territoriality and nonintervention into a State’s internal affairs).
112. See STÉPHANE BEAULAC, THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (2004).
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State actors. Instead, the assumption was that their States would
represent these actors at the interstate level.113 As Lauterpacht stated, “A
wrong done to the individual is a wrong done to his State.”114
The changing nature of international disputes is challenging the
historical assumptions that justified a State-centric international dispute
resolution system. Over the past several decades, armed conflict has
shifted from interstate to intrastate, and most wars today are intrastate.115
Intrastate disputes involve the rights and interests of individuals,
communities, and other non-State actors.
Resolving these disputes necessarily requires involving the key
stakeholders and considering the core issues. This is a challenge for
most international courts, which, for example, lack jurisdiction over
non-State actors and extralegal issues. Furthermore, it can be
challenging for courts to access the relevant stakeholders or confirm the
essential facts.116 Another challenge facing international courts in this
context is that States are often reluctant to participate in a process that
equalizes the power of non-State parties.117
These challenges require reevaluating the role and function of
international courts in today’s world. Prioritizing international dispute
resolution as a normative aim requires international courts to address
their strengths and weaknesses. It also raises important questions about
how open and accessible international legal processes should be.118

113. See id. at 179.
114. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 42, at 154.
115. See SARKEES & WAYMAN, supra note 23, at 6, 562, 566 fig. 7.6 (explaining that the
Correlates of War (COW) Project, founded by J. David Singer in 1936, categorized armed
conflicts resulting in at least 1000 deaths and defined them as either interstate, extrastate, civil,
intrastate, and non-State conflicts. The 2010 COW study identified 655 wars between 1816 and
2007 and found a general constancy in the incidence of war onsets overall, while intrastate wars
are a growing percentage of the whole since WWII. The 2003 COW study of 401 wars between
1816 and 1997 also indicated a “negative correlation between extrastate and intrastate war
onsets”). See also J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict, 1946–2007, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2010 27, 27 (2009) (noting a similar trend and graphically depicting the negative
correlation between extrastate and intrastate war onsets. “At the beginning of 2008 . . . [all armed
conflicts worldwide] were civil conflicts between the government of a state, on the one hand, and
at least one internal group on the other.”).
116. See Spain, supra note 12, at 16–17.
117. Id. at 53.
118. For literature addressing these concerns in international law, see generally Thomas M.
Franck, U.S. Withdrawal from Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1985)
(observing that democracy is on the way to becoming a global entitlement); Samantha Besson,
Deliberative Demoi-cracy in the European Union, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS
DISCONTENTS 181 (Samantha Besson & Jose Luis Marti eds., 2006) (examining the territorial
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B. IDR as a System
One response to these challenges is to understand the international
judicial function as a component of a larger IDR system. IDR has
commonly been characterized as a spectrum of single-method options.119
The choice of IDR method is often conflated with the institution that
provides it. International courts and tribunals offer judicial methods of
dispute resolution. Commissions, organizations, and ad hoc groups offer
non-judicial methods of dispute resolution. Though exceptions exist,
such as the PCA’s offering of arbitration, conciliation, fact-finding and
inquiry, the prevailing perception remains that the choice of IDR
method is concordant with the institution that provides it.120 This
promotes methodological and institutional fragmentation, which can
foster a false perception that parties must choose between “legal” or
“diplomatic” IDR methods.
However, given the complexity of international disputes today,
dispute resolution often requires the use of more than one method. This
is why it is important to understand how various IDR methods and the
institutions that provide them operate alongside each other as a
comprehensive system. Collectively, each part of the system plays its
part and strengthens the overall objective. By appreciating how different
IDR processes contribute to effective dispute resolution, international
courts can enhance their ability to resolve disputes.
C. Integrating Judicial and Non-Judicial IDR
An important benefit that flows from understanding IDR as a
system is the practice of integrating judicial and non-judicial IDR
methods.121 The following cases illustrate integrated IDR (in either a
sequential or a mixed manner) and how such approaches have led to the
successful resolution of international disputes.
Sequential use of IDR occurs when parties apply multiple methods
to a dispute. For example, in the Red Sea Islands dispute between
Eritrea and Yemen, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration were applied
nature of subjects and how political communities engage in decision-making and other
democratic processes).
119. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 36 (1996) (discussing how mediation falls
between formal litigation and informal discussions on the spectrum of dispute resolution
methods).
120. Spain, supra note 12, at 34, 44.
121. For a full description of integration in IDR, see Spain, supra note 12, at 30–44.
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in a sequential manner.122 Armed conflict broke out after both nations
claimed rights to the Greater Hanish Islands, in part due to the mineral
and fishing resources located there. After engaging in mediation efforts
with Ethiopia, Egypt, the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, and
finally France, an agreement was reached that led the parties to submit
the matter to the PCA.123 The PCA issued two awards that delimited
maritime boundaries and clarified fishing privileges.124 The use of
multiple forms of IDR in a sequential process ultimately led to a
resolution of the dispute with Eritrea acknowledging that this outcome
would “pave the way for a harmonious relationship between the littoral
States of the Red Sea”125 and Yemen noting that the PCA award was the
“culmination of a great diplomatic effort.”126
In the Pedra Branca dispute between Malaysia and Singapore,
both countries engaged in negotiations prior to and after referring the
case to adjudication before the ICJ.127 The use of judicial settlement at
the ICJ and mediation with local stakeholders in the Frontier Dispute
case helped the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso reach a ceasefire and work to resolve their underlying resource disputes.128 In the
122. For literature describing the dispute and the various IDR methods applied, see Jeffrey
Lefebvre, Red Sea Security and the Geopolitical-Economy of the Hanish Islands Dispute, 52
MIDDLE E. J. 367, 373–76 (1998) (detailing the roots of the conflict); B.G. Ramcharan,
Preventing War between Eritrea and Yemen over the Hanish Islands, in CONFLICT PREVENTION
IN PRACTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JIM SUTTERLIN 157, 157–68 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
2005) (tracking the progression of mediation methods utilized to prevent armed conflict between
Yemen and Eritrea); Daniel J. Dzurek, Eritrea-Yemen Dispute over the Hanish Islands, 4 INT’L
BOUNDARIES RES. UNIT BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 70, 73 (1996) (providing an example of
Eritrea’s attempts at IDR).
123. Dzurek, supra note 124, at 73.
124. Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (Eri. v. Yemen),
¶ 103 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1999), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/335-410.pdf, and
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Eri. v. Yemen), ¶ 526
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/209-332.pdf.
125. Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration: Landmark Progress in the
Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty and Equitable Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 8 INT’L
BOUNDARIES RES. UNIT BOUNDARY & SEC. BULL. 66, 67 (2000).
126. Id.
127. The countries agreed to submit the dispute to the ICJ through a negotiated Special
Agreement. See S. JAYAKUMAR & TOMMY KOH, PEDRA BRANCA: THE ROAD TO THE WORLD
COURT 35 (2009) (detailing the negotiations leading up to the resolution by the ICJ); Tan HsienLi, Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Palau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South
Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore), 12 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 257, 258 (2008) (describing the territorial
dispute in detail); Coalter G. Lathrop, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Palau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks and South Ledge, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 828, 828 (2008) (examining the ICJ’s treatment of
the dispute and its resolution).
128. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, 562.
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Thailand-Philippines dispute before the WTO, the parties engaged in
facilitation and mediation.129
The use of integrated IDR can also occur in a mixed manner,
defined as combining parts of different IDR methods into one cohesive
process. For example, in the Malaysia-Singapore case, the ITLOS
integrated fact-finding and facilitation into its judicial approach by
calling for “the establishment of a group of independent experts to study
the land reclamation issues” and make recommendations.130
D. New Roles for International Courts
Enhancing the international judicial function of dispute resolution
through integrated IDR can only occur if international courts embrace
new roles.131 This article suggests three.
First, courts should recognize how non-judicial IDR can contribute
to the resolution of international disputes. To do so, international courts
need to understand the value of non-judicial IDR methods. These
methods are collaborative, interest-based, voluntary, non-binding, and
ad hoc in nature. They have benefits that judicial processes do not, such
as encouraging parties to address emotional and psychological factors
that are contributing to their dispute.132 Interest-based IDR methods help
the parties adopt shared norms and expectations, which enhances the
legitimacy of the outcomes.133 Mediation, for example, offers States full
participation in and some control over the process, the ability to address
the full range of issues and stakeholders, and offers face-saving political
aspects.134 This may explain why States prefer mediation to judicial
129. Request for Mediation by the Philippines, Thailand and the European Communities,
Communication from the Director-General, ¶ 5, WT/GC/66 (Oct. 16, 2002); Nilaratna Xuto,
Thailand: Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES
OF WTO PARTICIPATION, 45 CASE STUDIES 555, 560 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005) (detailing
the agreement by the parties to submit to mediation, should the consultations fail).
130. Sands, supra note 1, at 68.
131. See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN
EVOLVING GLOBAL SOCIETY: CONSTITUTIONALIZATION, ACCESSIBILITY, PRIVATIZATION 22
(2004) (discussing how globalization makes new demands of international courts and the
importance of nonjudicial IDR methods).
132. See Herbert C. Kelman, Socio-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict, in
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 61, 63 (I. William
Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997) (discussing the emotional and psychological
underpinnings of international conflict).
133. For literature discussing the use and value of non-judicial IDR, see JACOB BERCOVITCH
AND RICHARD JACKSON, CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES,
METHODS, AND APPROACHES (2009).
134. BERCOVITCH & FRETTER, supra note 70, at 29 fig. 2.
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settlement as a method of addressing international disputes that arise in
the context of armed conflict.135
Beyond recognition, international courts should also engage in
referral, when appropriate. Just as domestic courts refer cases to
settlement talks or mediation, international courts can do the same.136
The ICJ has stated that:
the judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view to which
the Court has been established, is simply an alternative to the direct
and friendly settlement of such disputes between the Parties; . . .
consequently it is for the Court to facilitate, so far as is compatible
137
with its Statute, such direct and friendly settlement.

In Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project, the ICJ has called upon, encouraged, and even ordered parties
to engage in other forms of IDR.138 In North Sea Continental Shelf, the
ICJ required the parties to utilize a conciliation commission to continue
negotiation about the delimitation of the maritime boundary.139 The ICJ
discussed several criteria for the negotiation but left it to the parties to
determine the result.140 In Qatar v. Bahrain, the ICJ required the parties
to negotiate prior to submitting the case after Saudi Arabia had
attempted to resolve the matter through mediation.141 The ICJ also
ordered the parties to undertake negotiation in good faith for an
equitable solution of their differences in Fisheries Jurisdiction.142 There,
the Court stated:
135. Id. See also Patrick M. Norton, The Nicaragua Case: Political Questions Before the
International Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 459 (1987) (“States generally prefer means of
dispute resolution other than adjudication. This preference is attributable to the risks of
adjudication generally, the potential for bias in adjudication in international disputes, and the
inherent inability of the judicial process to fashion durable solutions to complex international
problems.”).
136. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
137. See Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), Judgment, 2000 I.C.J. 2, ¶ 52
(June 21) (citing Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), Order, 1929
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22, at 13 (Aug. 19)).
138. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 24 (June
3); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 30.
139. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 28
(Feb. 20).
140. Id.
141. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112 (July 1) and Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 15).
142. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. 3, 32 ¶¶ 74–75, 79(3)
& (4), (July 25); (declaration by Judge Ignacio-Pinto and dissenting opinion of Judge Petrén).
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It is implicit in the concept of preferential rights that negotiations are
required in order to define or delimit the extent of those rights . . . .
The obligation to negotiate thus flows from the very nature of the
respective rights of the Parties: to direct them to negotiate is
therefore a proper exercise of the judicial function in this case. This
also corresponds to the principals and provisions of the Charter of
143
the United Nations concerning peaceful settlement of disputes.

In these cases, the ICJ referred the parties to interest-based dispute
resolution methods in addition to providing them with the rights-based
process of adjudication.144
The PCA has also engaged in referral in the Abyei Arbitration,
where, in determining the boundaries of the Ngok Dinka chiefdoms, the
PCA called upon the parties to take the next step to executing the final
arbitration award, noting the need to develop a “survey team to
demarcate the Abyei Area as delimited by this Award,”145 and issuing its
hopes “that the spirit of reconciliation and cooperation visible
throughout these proceedings . . . will continue to animate the Parties on
this matter.”146

143. Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1974 I.C.J. at 32, ¶¶ 74–75. But see Dissent, Judge Ignacio-Pinto
(the ICJ’s role is to make decisions based on law) and Dissent, Judge Petren (there is no
obligation to negotiate absent a common agreement between the parties).
144. Special Agreement between Denmark and the FRG (Feb. 2, 1967), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/51/9329.pdf and Special Agreement between the FRG and the Netherlands,
1967 I.C.J. ¶ 2 (Feb. 2), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/51/9329.pdf; Special Agreement
between Tunisia and Libya, art. 2 (June 10, 1977), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/
9511.pdf; Special Agreement between Hungary and Slovakia, art. 5, ¶ 2 (Apr. 7, 1993),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/10835.pdf. See also YASUHIRO SHIGETA, INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: STANDARD SETTING, COMPLIANCE
CONTROL AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 44–48 (2010)
(discussing the ICJ’s decisions in the Fisheries cases).
145. Delimiting Abyei Area, Final Award, supra note 8, ¶ 769.
146. Id. (settling the dispute over the Abyei Area by resolving conflicts over the boundary
lines); see Hans, Abyei Arbitration Award, Abyei Arbitration Award, PEACE PALACE LIBRARY
(July 22, 2009, 3:18 PM), http://peacepalacelibrary-weekly.blogspot.com/2009/07/abyeiarbitration-award.html (summarizing the key elements of the final award of the Abyei
Arbitration). The Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army signed the Arbitration Agreement on July 7, 2008,
authorizing the referral of the dispute to the PCA for final and binding arbitration. At issue was
whether or not the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC), established by the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), exceeded its mandate under the CPA to delimit and demarcate an area
identified as the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms. The parties agreed in the Arbitration Agreement to
authorize the PCA, upon a finding that the ABC did exceed its mandate to delimit and demarcate
the area in dispute. The PCA determined that the ABC did exceed its mandate in part.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Government Sudan-
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The practice of referral raises questions that international courts
will need to address. Should referral, for example, be based on what is
in the best interest of the parties or what a court deems necessary to
achieve resolution? What is the appropriate order of applying different
forms of IDR? If international courts engage in referral, how might this
jeopardize their judicial settlement function?147 While considering
important questions such as these, international courts should strive to
normalize the practice of referring parties to non-judicial IDR, when
appropriate, as a part of the judicial function. Through referral,
international courts can promote the use of integrated IDR and support
the development of adequate institutional capacity for non-judicial
methods.
A third and more intensive role for international courts is that of a
coordinator of IDR methods.148 The international judiciary might
advance the resolution of international disputes by serving as a “MultiDoor Courthouse” of sorts, which informs and encourages disputing
parties to engage in IDR methods beyond judicial settlement. By
engaging in this role, international courts will be able to promote
systematic integration of IDR methods across institutions, while also
insulating their primary function as dispute settlers. They will also
contribute to the development of a coherent and functional structure that
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Jan. 9, 2005,
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-Docs-CPA-1.pdf (outlining the terms of the
comprehensive peace agreement established by the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army on Jan. 9, 2005). But see
generally Delimiting Abyei Area (Sudan v. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army)
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2009)
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=1242 (criticizing the Court for not doing enough to
resolve the dispute, although subsequent to the decision both parties announced that they would
accept and abide by the PCA’s ruling).
147. For example, there is a concern that adding additional IDR methods might contribute to
the existing problem of fragmentation in the international judicial system, as described in
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law, Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th sess., May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, ¶ 24,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
148. See Higgins, supra note 39, at 15–20 (suggesting that the ICJ can help prompt
integration between judicial and other dispute resolution forums across regions and cultures but
should not aim to replace them as a supranational body); Paul S. Berman, Global Legal
Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2007) (introducing the idea that countries should
embrace multiple ways of resolving conflict because of the insights the various actors can
provide); Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative Integration as
Authority Allocation, in The SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 99, 99–100 (Tomer Broude &
Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
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clarifies the relational web among methods. Doing so will create a space
for the development of complex integrated IDR approaches that can
contribute to the resolution of international disputes.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that international courts exist to serve a
functional purpose of settling international disputes as well as a
normative one of promoting global peace and security. As an alternative
to the dichotomy of viewing international courts as dispute settlers or as
peacemakers, the article has proposed an alternative framework for
understanding the international judicial function as one of dispute
resolution. As dispute resolvers, international courts exist alongside
other institutions in an IDR system. International courts can enhance
their ability to contribute to dispute resolution by recognizing the value
of other IDR methods and referring parties to engage in such methods
when appropriate. Furthermore, international courts can provide
institutional support integrating judicial and other dispute resolution
methods. By embracing these new roles, international courts will
enhance their ability to resolve disputes and promote a more peaceful
and secure world.

